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some theories of well-being in philosophy and in psychology define people’s 
well-being in psychological terms. according to these theories, living well is getting 
what you want, feeling satisfied, experiencing pleasure, or the like. Other theories 
take well-being to be something that is not defined by our psychology; for example, 
they define well-being in terms of objective values or the perfection of our human 
nature. These two approaches present us with a trade-off: The more we define well-
being in terms of people’s psychology, the less ideal it seems and the less it looks like 
something of real value that could be an important aim of human life. On the other 
hand, the more we define well-being in terms of objective features of the world that 
do not have to do with people’s psychological states, the less it looks like something 
that each of us has a reason to promote. in this paper i argue that we can take a middle 
path between these two approaches if we hold that well-being is an ideal but an ideal 
that is rooted in our psychology. The middle path that i propose is one that puts 
what people value at the center of the theory of well-being. in the second half of the 
paper i consider how the value-based theory i describe should be applied to real life 
situations.
inTrOdUCTiOn
Well-being is, by definition, what is good for you. if you achieve well-being in 
your life, you may not have lived a morally perfect life and your life may not have 
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made any great contribution to art, world peace or progress, but you will have lived 
a life that is good for you. even though a good life in this sense is not the same as a 
perfect life (whatever that might be), well-being is still an ideal. it is something we 
strive for and we certainly do not all achieve it. Our well-being may be diminished by 
health problems, bad financial luck, the death of a loved one, poor planning, or many 
other factors. even if we are lucky and things go well for us, the ideal of a good life 
serves as a goal for our aspirations about how things might go even better.1 
 There are a variety of different theories of well-being in philosophy and in 
psychology that take well-being to be an ideal to different degrees. some theories 
define well-being in terms of people’s psychology to a much greater degree than 
others. Theories that define well-being in terms of our psychology directly keep the 
ideal down to earth. Other theories define well-being in terms of objective values 
or the perfection of our human nature and these theories let the ideal move farther 
away from people’s actual psychological perspective. These two approaches present 
us with a trade-off: The more we define well-being in terms of people’s subjective 
psychological states, the less ideal it seems and the less it looks like something of 
value that could be an important aim of human life. On the other hand, the more we 
define a person’s well-being in terms of objective features of the world that do not 
have to do with his or her psychological states, the less it looks like something with 
which a person should obviously be concerned or something he or she has a reason 
to promote.
 What i want to argue in this paper is that we can take a middle path between 
these two approaches if we say that well-being is an ideal—something it makes sense 
to say is valuable—but an ideal that is anchored in our psychology. Other theories 
have taken this path. Full information theory, for instance, defines well-being in 
terms of idealized psychological states, namely the desires that we would have if we 
were fully informed. i believe such theories are on the right track, but i also think that 
existing theories of this kind can be improved upon. in this paper i propose a version 
of these idealized subjective theories that i hope shares their virtues and avoids their 
shortcomings.
 idealized subjective theories in general have the problem that we do not have 
ideal psychologies to work with, which means that there are special difficulties for 
1.  at least by my definition of well-being. There is some controversy about how this and related 
concepts should be used, but these controversies need not concern us here. The good for a person is 
what i mean to be talking about and the particular word used to refer to it is not of great importance.
Volume 2, Issue 2
How Theories Of Well-being Can Help Us Help  3
applying such theories of well-being. if we don’t have access to what our psychologi-
cal states would be like ideally, how do we help promote well-being defined in terms 
of such states? i answer this question by articulating a different way that a theory of 
well-being can be helpful. instead of providing us with a detailed picture of all the 
elements of an ideally good life, i argue, a theory of well-being can give us practical 
guidance about how to change a person’s life so that it improves. in other words, 
a theory of well-being can fulfill its practical function by instructing us about the 
process of improving people’s lives rather than by giving us a sharp picture of the 
ultimate goal.
 so, this paper has two aims: first, to describe a theory of well-being that strikes 
the right balance between real and ideal, and second, to show how this theory can 
be applied to the practical matter of helping improve people’s well-being. in the first 
section of the paper i will explain in a little more detail the background that i’ve gone 
over quickly in this introduction. in section two, i will outline the theory i favor: the 
value fulfillment theory of well-being. in section three i discuss how the theory can 
be applied.
real Or ideal?
 some theories define well-being in terms of our actual psychological states. 
Many psychologists, for example, think that well-being consists in life satisfaction 
and positive affect balance (roughly, more pleasant feelings than painful ones) (diener 
1984; diener 2006). some philosophers agree that well-being should be defined in 
terms of mental states like pleasure and pain. according to hedonism about well-
being, the good life for a person is a life that has the most pleasure and the least pain 
(Crisp 2006; Feldman 2004). Others (many philosophers and economists) think that 
desires or preferences are the right psychological state to focus on. according to the 
desire satisfaction theory of well-being, the good life for a person consists in getting 
the most of what she ultimately wants over the course of her lifetime (Heathwood 
2006; Heathwood 2005).
 all of these theories have something going for them and it is not the purpose 
of this paper to show that these theories are wrong. What i want to point out is that 
these theories make well-being depend very heavily on our individual psychologies. 
What we happen to take pleasure in, to be satisfied by, or to want fundamentally 
determines what is good for us. it’s not that these theories don’t give us any ideal 
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to which to aspire at all, but rather that the ideals these theories posit are defined in 
terms of each person’s actual psychology. For instance, the ideally good life according 
to desire satisfaction theory is not the life that many people actually achieve (few of 
us are able to get all the things that we want), but it is an ideal that is fixed by what we 
really do want.
 Though these theories do give us something of an ideal, many will find these 
ideals wanting. Well-being is supposed to be one of the main goals of human life, 
that at which we aim in deliberation and planning when we think about how to live 
our lives. Could the mere satisfaction of our desires play such a role? Think about 
someone whose desires seem ill suited to living a good life, for example, someone 
who desires nothing but money and power, or a person with anorexia nervosa who 
desire to be thin above all else. We might think that a theory of well-being ought to 
allow us to question whether satisfying these desires really is good for a person in 
any way, but actual desire satisfaction theory does not allow this.2 Or think about the 
well-being of children. People tend to think that part of what it is to raise children 
well is to instill the right desires in them so that they want to be productive, decent 
people. if well-being is just desire satisfaction, it is unclear where these standards for 
the “right desires” will come from.
 Other theories of well-being allow the ideally good life for a person to move 
farther away from her psychology. according to eudaimonism, for instance, the good 
life for a person is the one in which she fulfills her human nature, where what counts 
as a person’s nature has much to do with what is normal for members of the human 
species not with what this particular person happens to like (Foot 2001). Objective 
list theories of well-being say that a good life for a person is one in which she achieves 
certain objective goods such as friendship, knowledge and pleasure (arneson 1999; 
Finnis 1980). such theories make well-being an ideal that could be far removed from 
what a person actually thinks about what is good for her. if she is different from other 
human beings, or doesn’t care about certain objective values, for example, the way 
that the theory defines well-being for her might not be something she has any real 
interest in pursuing.
 We can now see more clearly the trade-off that i mentioned in the introduc-
tion. Theories that make well-being a function of our actual psychology do not 
2.  actual desire theory does allow some room for criticizing defective desires, for instance, on the 
grounds that satisfying one will cause one to have less overall desire satisfaction in the long term. see 
Heathwood (2005).
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explain why well-being is a valuable goal of human life. Theories that idealize well-
being away from our actual psychology do not explain why well-being should be our 
goal.
THe ValUe FUlFillMenT THeOry OF Well-Being
 There are surely many ways of resolving this problem. To argue that one way 
is better than any other possible way is far beyond the scope of a single paper. instead, 
i will take an approach that has seemed promising to many and put a new spin on it 
that makes it an even more compelling solution. in doing so, my starting assumption 
is that a theory of well-being must explain why well-being is a valuable ideal and also 
why it is a valuable ideal for each of us.
 The promising approach i have in mind defines well-being in terms of a per-
son’s ideal psychology: for example, theories according to which well-being consists 
in getting what you would desire if you were fully informed and rational, or what 
your fully informed self would want you to want, or what you take to be a satisfying 
life insofar as your assessment is fully authentic (railton 1986; griffin 1986; Brandt 
1979; sumner 1996). such theories promise to explain how well-being is specially 
related to individual subjects, because they appeal to an individual’s desires or sat-
isfactions. They promise to explain how well-being is something valuable, because 
they do not take our desires and satisfactions at face value, but rather as these desires 
and satisfactions might be improved in accordance with norms of improvement (such 
as rationality or authenticity).
 it seems to me that the promise of these idealized subjective theories (as i 
called them in the introduction) has not been fully appreciated. One reason for this 
is the serious objections to full information as a norm of improvement. Philosophers 
have argued that the ideal is at best alienating and at worst incoherent (rosati 1995; 
Velleman 1988; Tiberius 1997). another reason has to do with the psychological states 
that have been at the center of these theories; critics have argued strenuously against 
the relevance of desire and life satisfaction to well-being (richard Kraut 1994; Haybron 
2011). The theory i propose is an idealized subjective theory that takes values (rather 
than desires or satisfactions) as the key psychological state, and a model of a value full 
life (rather than an informed or authentic agent) as its ideal. in the remainder of this 
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section i will explain the theory in more detail, in the hope that a good description of 
it will reveal its advantages.3
 let’s think first about which psychological states a theory of well-being should 
concern itself with? Preferences? Pleasures? life satisfaction? i believe that the aspect 
of our psychology it makes most sense to attend to in our theories of well-being is 
our values. This is because values are what people themselves take to be relevant to 
how their lives are going; our values are the goals we plan around and use to assess 
how well we’re doing in life. For this reason, a theory of well-being that focuses on 
what people value is well suited to explain why well-being is something that people 
have a particular reason to care about. Moreover, values are held to standards in ways 
that desires or pleasures are not; it makes sense to talk about what it is appropriate to 
value and we tend to think that we should have reasons for valuing what we value. 
This gives values a leg up when it comes to well-being, because it allows them to make 
sense of how we can go wrong in pursuing our well-being. accounting for how we 
could go wrong or make mistakes about what is good for us is needed to make sense 
of well-being as a normative notion.4
 To value something is, in part, to be motivated with respect to it; desires and 
values are similar in this respect. But values have a special status in our planning and 
evaluation, they have greater stability than mere preferences and they are emotionally 
entrenched in ways that desires might not be. For example, a person who values being 
a parent will be disposed to make plans that include spending time with her child, to 
feel joyful when she spends time with her child, disappointed when she misses her 
child’s ballet recital, and so on. she will also be inclined to take into account how well 
she is doing as a parent when she thinks about how well her life is going and how she 
could improve. in short, then, values are what we value, and to value is to have a co-
ordinated pattern of emotions and motivations toward something that you take to be 
relevant to how your life goes. not all values are fully realized—sometimes our moti-
vations to act, our emotions and our judgments are out of sync with each other —but 
values in their most complete sense include all these elements. Values, as i intend 
them, then, are relative to subjects; different people may value different things. That 
3.  i defend a close relative of this view in more detail in Tiberius 2008.
4.  This is an important topic in its own right and more needs to be said about how the value 
fulfillment theory makes sense of the possibility of error. i will say a little more about this shortly, but 
my main focus in this paper is on how the theory can be used for guidance.
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said, there are many shared values, especially when it comes to relatively basic values: 
almost everyone values health, happiness, friendship, family and meaningful work.5
 now that we know what values are we can see how they fit into what i call the 
value fulfillment theory of well-being or VFT. according to VFT, a person’s life goes 
well to the extent that she pursues and fulfills or realizes things that she values where 
those values are emotionally suitable, mutually realizable and seen by the person to 
make her life go well.6 The best life for a person is the one in which she gets the most 
value fulfillment she can, given her personality and environment, and what is good 
for you now is to do what contributes to some specification of the best, “value full” 
life. in short, we live well when we realize what matters to us over time. This includes 
achieving certain states of affairs (such as career goals) and also maintaining the posi-
tive affective orientation that comprises valuing something. if your (suitable and re-
alizable) values include your own enjoyment, relationships with family and friends, 
accomplishing something in your career, and contributing to certain morally worth-
while projects, then your life goes well for you insofar as you have good relationships 
and career success, make a moral contribution and enjoy what you’re doing, as these 
continue to be the things you care about.
 What it is for a value to be fulfilled or realized and what it means to say that 
one life has more value fulfillment than another are obviously very important for 
VFT. Values, like desires, bring with them standards for success, and living up to 
these standards is part of value fulfillment. These standards are not always as obvious; 
some values are such that we succeed in their terms by having the right attitudes or 
being a certain kind of person. nevertheless, there are standards for values in the 
sense that there are ways of responding appropriately or inappropriately given the 
nature of what is valued (see anderson 1995). Moreover, most values encompass stan-
dards that are objective in the sense that whether or not we fulfill them is not a matter 
of whether we believe we are fulfilling them. There is something to meeting the stan-
dards that our values impose that goes beyond our subjective experience. in this 
respect, value fulfillment is similar to preference satisfaction: you may fail to get what 
you want without knowing it (say, if you are seriously deluded), and you may fail to 
fulfill your values, though you believe otherwise. Finally, if we are going to achieve 
what matters to us, it is not only success in terms of what is valued that matters, but 
5.  For a more thorough discussion of this view of values and the research on what people value 
see Tiberius 2008.
6.  For a similar approach to the relationship between values and well-being see raibley 2010.
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also the valuing attitudes themselves. We require some stability in our valuing atti-
tudes if we are going to succeed by the standards we think are important. (Of course, 
there is such a thing as too much stability: how much stability is required, and when 
change is recommended, are difficult practical questions, as we will see in the next 
section). Value fulfillment, then, is succeeding by the standards of your values while 
continuing to think that these standards are important to how well your life goes.
 assessing total value fulfillment requires attending to the relationships 
between values. People’s values are typically complex. We value some things largely 
as a means to others (for example, you might value running marathons as a means 
to the values of health and fitness). We value some things as constitutive of other 
more abstract things (for example, you might value playing the piano as a way of 
valuing music). some values are more important to us than others and some values 
have a more central role in the whole system. These considerations must be taken 
into account when we evaluate total value fulfillment and we ask whether one life 
has more overall value fulfillment than another. importantly, it is not necessarily the 
case that getting more fulfillment of a single value at the expense of fulfilling others 
to a smaller degree contributes to the best overall life. This is because of the ways in 
which values are related to each other. Consider a simple example to illustrate this 
point. imagine Bob, a person whose main values are meaningful work and family life. 
as with most people, Bob finds that these two values often conflict with each other 
because of the amount of time they each demand. you might think that VFT implies 
that Bob would be better off quitting his job and attending to his family, or leaving his 
family and focusing on his career, but VFT implies no such thing. First of all, if work 
and family are really both important to Bob, he might very well get more total fulfill-
ment by achieving each of these values to a lesser degree than he would by achieving 
either on its own. But more importantly, for a normal human being like Bob it is very 
unlikely that he could make great strides in one if the other were entirely abandoned. 
This is partly because of diminishing returns (working all the time often does not lead 
to progress). and it is partly because of the role of other values that Bob (like most 
normal human beings) has: Bob’s health would likely be affected by his working all 
the time and not developing close personal relationships, his enjoyment would likely 
be decreased by spending all his time in one way, and so on.
 We can now see how the value fulfillment theory promises to accommodate 
both sides of the trade-off for theories of well-being. it defines well-being in terms 
of a person’s individual psychology, namely, her values. But it also posits an ideal 
Volume 2, Issue 2
How Theories Of Well-being Can Help Us Help  9
and allows for the possibility that a person’s psychological states are in need of im-
provement or transformation (thus allowing for the possibility of error). For example, 
the person with anorexia nervosa has values that are just not conducive to a value 
full life, since the value of thinness competes with other values (physical and mental 
health) and even with life itself (a necessary pre-condition for value fulfillment). The 
compelling ideal of a value full life—a life in which we do well by what matters to 
us—does constrain which values it makes sense for a person to have. nevertheless, 
the ideal does not impose external values on a person in a way that risks its appearing 
unrecognizable to someone as what is good for him or her.
aPPlying THe ValUe FUlFillMenT 
THeOry: FrOM ideal TO real
 One problem with idealized subjective theories is that we do not have access 
to our ideal psychological states and this makes it difficult to apply such theories to 
real life problems. The value fulfillment theory is certainly not immune to this diffi-
culty; indeed, in some ways the focus on values and the ideal of a value full life makes 
the problem worse. The ideal of a value full life provides guidance for thinking about 
what a good life is through the standard of the fulfillment of a set of values over time, 
but even with these guidelines about what counts as fulfillment, there are many dif-
ferent ways of living a life in which you value and have good friendships, meaningful 
work, enjoyable experiences, and so on. The complexity of systems of values and 
the fact that values themselves are open to interpretation mean that there will be no 
single, well-defined best life for a person overall or even at a particular time. This is 
in part because the “units” of value fulfillment are large and in part because there are 
different ways that values can be successfully organized even for a single person. if 
the units of fulfillment were small, we could rank possible lives in terms of minute 
gains and losses. if there were only one way for a particular set of values to be realized 
together, then there would be a clear sense in which there is a best life for a person. 
But this is not how values are. instead, the value fulfillment approach tells us that the 
good life for a person overall is one of the lives in a set of roughly equivalently value 
full lives that constitutes a model of a good life for a person.7
7.  raibley (2012) uses the notion of a “paradigm” where i prefer to talk about a model. i think it 
is just as useful and perhaps a bit more precise to think about a set of best lives for a person that is a 
model of well-being.
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 There are, in other words, many different shapes that the ideal of a value full 
life can take and, to make matters worse, what is in that set of value full lives will 
change over time as the person makes choices that close off some options and open 
others.8 it’s easy to see this when it comes to career choices. There is a point in one’s 
life when the value of meaningful work could be specified in many different ways, 
constituted by many different kinds of work. But as a person ages, acquires train-
ing and specialization, the options for living a life with the most value fulfillment 
change. Whereas there is a time at which being a teacher, doctor or baker could all 
have roughly equal value fulfillment, once you have spent 20 years practicing law the 
calculation is not the same. This is certainly not to say that making large changes can 
never improve your life, however, the amount of value fulfillment you can expect by 
quitting your job as a lawyer mid-career and going to medical school is different from 
the amount of value fulfillment you can expect as a young person deciding between 
medicine and the law. similarly, as anyone who has children will tell you, once you 
have children your values change profoundly; you suddenly value your child, your 
relationship with him or her, and your identity as a parent. Therefore, once you have 
children, it is almost certainly true that all of the lives that have the most value fulfill-
ment for you are lives in which your children are healthy and happy and you enjoy 
being a parent to them. But for many people, before they have children there are value 
full lives open to them that do not include having children.
 applying the theory, then, is not going to be a simple matter. But we can make 
progress by thinking of the practical contexts in which such applications take place. 
What practical purposes do theories of well-being have? For what purpose would we 
need to translate the ideal life given by a theory of well-being into reality? Basically, 
we need to bring the ideal down to reality when we want to help somebody (or help 
ourselves), to make their (or our) lives better. it is as potential benefactors that we try 
to discern the exact shape of a good life, and this endeavor takes place in a particular 
context that determines whom we aim to help and in what way. (in what follows i 
focus mainly on friends as potential benefactors and beneficiaries, but the points i’ll 
make can be extended to other relationships. Benefactor and beneficiary could even 
be the same person if the context is of someone who is trying to evaluate and improve 
her own life).
 according to the value fulfillment theory, there are some broad guidelines 
8.  Of course, this is true for desire satisfaction theories too, but it is not often noticed as a chal-
lenge for the application of theory.
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for what a benefactor should attend to in almost any context: if you are trying to 
assess how well a person is doing you will need to ascertain (a) what that person’s core 
values are9, (2) how well she is succeeding in terms of these values, and (3) how likely 
it is that the status quo will lead to a life of high total value fulfillment over time. To 
figure out how the person’s life could be improved you also need to think about how 
things could be different such that greater total value fulfillment will be achieved. 
This requires thinking not only about what kinds of core values and specifications 
of cores values would be more compatible and more likely to lead to fulfillment, but 
also about what kinds of changes the person is actually capable of making and how 
she sees her own good. For example, consider Jane, a person who values creativity 
and accomplishment, but who has manifested these values in her life with a career for 
which she has no talent. let’s say Jane has dedicated herself to writing novels, but she 
is destined to experience only frustration as a writer. To help Jane we need to think 
about how else these values can be realized in a life and whether she could become a 
person who fulfills these values in a different way, say through practicing an art for 
which she has more talent, or by seeing the creative aspect of something for which 
she does have talent.
  These things are not easy to figure out, but they do seem like the right things to 
think about when we aim to understand how someone is doing and to help improve 
her situation: how is she doing with respect to what she cares about, does she care 
about the right things given her personality and circumstances, and could her situa-
tion or her values be changed so as to make her life one in which she is better able to 
achieve what matters to her. When we see that such assessments of how people are 
doing take place in a practical context, new challenges arise. These challenges give 
rise to more guidelines for the process of translating the ideal into reality.
 The first kind of challenge is epistemological: there are a variety of things that 
the benefactor might not know that will affect his or her ability to assess how much 
the beneficiary’s life resembles the ideal and how it could be improved. in particular, 
the benefactor needs to know (and might be wrong about): what a good life is for the 
person in broad terms, how the ideal could be specified, what changes are required 
for bringing about the better life, and what changes the person is capable of making. 
9.  “Core values” are values that are more important, more central and/or more likely to be at 
least in part valued intrinsically. i think these features of values are a matter of degree; so, a particu-
lar value can be more or less core. Core values are often very general and need to be instantiated or 
specified in some particular way to be pursued
Journal of Practical Ethics
 VALERIE TIBERIUS12
no one (including the person herself) could possibly have perfect knowledge about 
all of these things, but some will have better information than others.
 There is no easy solution to the epistemological problem. The basic guide-
lines for potential benefactors are to try to acquire more knowledge, to proceed on 
the basis of conservative assumptions about what almost everyone values, and to 
proceed with caution given the possibility that we do not know how to help. On the 
first point, we can think about acquiring knowledge about the particular person or 
group of people we are trying to help. it is also helpful to learn about human psychol-
ogy in general: for instance, how human beings tend to reveal what they really value 
(what clues to look for) and how people are able (or unable) to change course in life. 
learning about human nature generally can help us make reasonable assumptions 
about what core values individual people are likely to have. (note, however, that it is 
still the individual person’s relationship to the value—not the human species’ rela-
tionship to it, as eudaimonism would have it—that explains why it is good for her). 
Many of the values people have are socially sanctioned, highly stable and abstract 
enough that how they are fulfilled is open to interpretation: for example, health, plea-
sure, close family ties, friendship, comfort and security. These values are quite likely 
to be a part of any of the best lives a person could live (though particular means to 
them might differ) and therefore they form an excellent basis for well-being assess-
ments. We can also assume that values that are related to other values in fundamental 
ways—as necessary conditions for their pursuit (such as health), or as a justification 
for other values (such as psychological happiness)—will be stable and emotionally 
appropriate over the long term. a useful heuristic, then, in assessing well-being and 
making judgments about how to benefit people, is to pay attention to the basic values 
that are likely to be part of the best life for anyone. We shouldn’t underestimate how 
far this takes us.
 The fact that we might lack crucial information about a person’s situation or 
the ideal life for her is one significant problem, but there is a second kind of chal-
lenge that is independent of our epistemic position. even if you are correct about 
what is good for a person and what is wrong with the way she is currently living 
her life, intervening in someone’s life on behalf of values that you think would be 
more appropriate for them introduces costs in value fulfillment terms: ruptures to 
the bonds of friendship, pain and dissatisfaction. Most of us have had friends who 
pursue romantic relationships that are bad for them, but it is rarely a good idea to take 
drastic measures to prevent our friends from making dating mistakes. a friend who 
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criticizes our choices too much is not one we are likely to confide in or turn to for help 
when things turn out badly. Overriding or ignoring the actual values of someone 
with whom one has a professional (rather than friendly) relationship in order to help 
that person causes its own problems such as the feeling of being disrespected, the 
erosion of trust in helping professionals, and the violation of role defined obligations. 
Finally, success by the standards of an inappropriate value is not always entirely bad 
for a person. This is because of the relationship between values: succeeding in any 
terms (even if the value achieved is not perfectly appropriate for you in the long term) 
usually brings pleasure, a sense of satisfaction or accomplishment, and other valued 
rewards. For all these reasons, the fact that a person’s values could be better for her 
does not license us to ignore her actual values in the usual case.
 it does seem, though, that there are some contexts in which it makes sense to 
discount a person’s inappropriate values in practice, such as when these values are so 
dysfunctional that they do not have any connections to other values and rewards, or 
when the risks of negative consequences are minimal. For example, a friend who is 
putting herself and her children at risk by staying in an abusive relationship almost 
certainly needs to adjust her values (on the assumption that she does value the rela-
tionship, which of course she may not). in this case, continuing to value the relation-
ship with the abusive partner is at odds with other things she values more, or should 
value more if she is going to live a life of high value fulfillment. it might indeed be a 
duty of friendship to try to intervene in some way or another with this friend’s situ-
ation. To take a less dire example, a student who asks for guidance from a teacher 
might be well served by advice that recommends changing her goals.
 The second type of challenge, then, is the challenge of ascertaining whether it 
is desirable (in terms of the goal of promoting well-being) to discount, ignore or over-
ride a person’s actual current values. let’s call this the interpersonal challenge. The 
interpersonal challenge also does not admit of an easy solution. But we can minimize 
the risk of making things worse by taking care to assess the circumstances before 
trying to help. some circumstances make it more appropriate to discount, ignore or 
override a person’s values than others. One factor that is relevant to any decision 
under uncertainty is the degree of risk of harm or benefit. if the beneficiary’s values 
are a clear and present danger to her, it makes more sense to ignore these values than 
if her values are just somewhat less than ideal. For example, in order to benefit a 
person who has become addicted to drugs or has fallen into a cult (long enough to 
say that she genuinely values participation in the cult) it might be necessary to ignore 
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or override her current values because they put her health and even her life in danger. 
second, it matters whether the beneficiary could actually change so as to have better, 
more ideal, values. if Jane is just never going to give up on her dream of being a writer, 
it might do no good for you to try to help her by engaging in a long term project of 
talking her into doing something else.
 a third important factor is the kind of relationship that exists between the 
benefactor and the beneficiary. What kinds of relationships make this sort of helping 
appropriate? i suggest that there are several important variables. Trust (that the person 
trying to help you has your best interests at heart) is important because it makes some 
room for honesty about what might be wrong with a person’s life and it makes it more 
likely that the beneficiary will accept (and hence benefit from) the benefactor’s help. 
a certain level of intimacy or understanding is also required among friends without 
which advice about how to live one’s life better might be taken to be nosy or conde-
scending. Trust and intimacy make a difference to whether someone will be bene-
fitted by help that assumes the need for a transformation of actual values. Making 
changes to our values is difficult, so we need to have some reasonable prospect that 
a proposed change would be good for us before we’ll put in the effort. advice from a 
person who knows us well (intimacy) and whom we trust to care about how well our 
lives are going is, prima facie, better than information from someone who knows us 
less well or whom we suspect of having ulterior motives. another important vari-
able is the extent to which the friends’ lives are intertwined. One thing that makes 
it more acceptable for a life partner to criticize the spouse’s actual values is that the 
two of them have to live together and they share each other’s burdens to a greater 
extent than most friends. a final important factor is the skill that the friend has in 
communicating difficult or sensitive information. some ways of telling a person that 
her goals are inappropriate and likely to make her life go poorly over the long term 
are more tolerable than others, and a more effective benefactor has the skills to com-
municate this information in the best way.
 no one of these variables is sufficient to determine whether it’s appropriate to 
discount a beneficiary’s values and there’s no algorithm for how much of each vari-
able is needed. you might have an intimate relationship with someone in the sense 
that you have a long history together and know each other to the core, but without 
trust such a friend’s suggestions about how we could better our lives are not helpful. 
Think of divorced partners who might know each other better than anyone else in 
the world, but who are in no position to give advice because there is no longer a 
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presumption that each has the other’s best interest at heart. Trust without intimacy 
is also not sufficient, because a trusted person who doesn’t know you very well can’t 
make good assessments about how you would be better off. For example, many of 
us have parents who value our welfare more than anything else, but are not well po-
sitioned to help us live better lives because they still see us as the children we once 
were. Trust and intimacy without skill are also problematic: someone who wants to 
help and knows enough about you to have a useful perspective, but who doesn’t have 
the sensitivity to communicate that perspective in a way you can accept isn’t in the 
best position to help you overcome your dysfunctional values. notice that the pres-
ence of certain formal relationships, such as the relationship between patient and 
therapist, can change the required balance of qualities: a therapist who is trusted and 
skilled can do with less intimate knowledge of the patient in part because he or she 
will have greater general knowledge of human psychology and professional knowl-
edge about the patient’s life. Finally, mutual dependence weighs against shortcom-
ings with respect to the other factors, because the costs of sticking with the status 
quo might be very high, but mutual dependence by itself is no guarantee if the other 
factors are absent.
 We have discussed a number of conditions for the appropriateness of dis-
counting, ignoring or overriding a beneficiary’s current values for the sake of helping 
to promote her well-being. To summarize, it can make sense for a benefactor to dis-
count, ignore or override a beneficiary’s actual values in assessing or trying to improve 
her well-being under four conditions:
1. The beneficiary’s values are truly harmful
2. The beneficiary could change
3. There is an appropriate relationship between the helper and the beneficiary, 
defined in terms of: intimacy, trust, skills of communication, and the extent to 
which lives are intertwined
4. The helper is in a good epistemic position with respect to the above.
These conditions are, in essence, guidelines for applying an ideal theory to a real 
life in practice. More guidance, as we have seen, is found in the value fulfillment the-
Journal of Practical Ethics
 VALERIE TIBERIUS16
ory’s account of what counts as a value full life. it is worth pointing out that there are 
many different ways of trying to help that might discount, override or ignore a ben-
eficiary’s current values. One can give advice, provide alternative options, withdraw 
support, directly intervene, coerce or force. These different actions vary in terms of 
how intrusive they are and the more intrusive, the higher the stakes. as one contem-
plates more intrusive actions for the sake of a person’s welfare, the above conditions 
become more stringent.
 Certainly, the story the value fulfillment theory tells about how to benefit 
people is not a simple one. if this theory is correct, it turns out that the practical ap-
plication of the theory of well-being requires those who want to help other people to 
figure out how those people’s lives could be closer to an ideal, where there are many 
different shapes the ideal could take in practice. is this a problem with the theory? i 
don’t think so, for two reasons. First, according to the value fulfillment theory (and, 
indeed, any plausible theory of well-being) there are many very easy ways to help very 
many people. almost everyone values health and enjoyment for themselves and their 
friends and family. deprivations that make it impossible to attain these values are an 
obvious road block to achieving well-being. in particular, people who are suffering 
from illness, who are in pain, or who lack basic material resources (of whom there are 
vast numbers in the world) can be helped tremendously by alleviating these impedi-
ments to living value full lives. There are even easy ways to help people who are more 
fortunate in terms of their basic needs, because there are many cases in which helping 
people to pursue their valued projects is exactly the best way to help improve their 
lives.
 second, for the other cases—cases in which a person is not deprived of the 
basic necessities that make it possible to live in accordance with her values and has 
values that are harmful to her in some way—it should not be surprising that it is not 
easy to help. To see why not, think of a paradigm type of case of dysfunctional values, 
a case in which core values conflict. For example, consider Joe, the gay evangelical 
Christian. Joe deeply values his religious identity and his church, and yet his sexual 
identity is completely rejected by this church. if Joe also values having satisfying ro-
mantic relationships, he is in trouble with this set of values. if you are Joe’s friend, 
how should you help him? given my own beliefs about religions like this, if i were 
Joe’s friend i would be likely to try to talk him into joining a different church. But is it 
completely obvious that this is the best way to help Joe? What if he is unable to get rid 
of the belief that living as a gay man would result in his eternal damnation? What if 
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he does not actually care that much about romantic relationships? What if by telling 
him to join a new church i reveal that i have no understanding of his religious iden-
tity at all and he loses confidence in one of the few people in his life with whom he 
can share this problem? My point here is not that one shouldn’t make some effort to 
get Joe to change his mind about his particular church (or about eternal damnation). 
rather, my point is that it’s hard to know what to do for Joe. 10 Cases like these are 
difficult and so it is no criticism of the value fulfillment theory that it acknowledges 
this fact of life. indeed it is a point in the theory’s favor that it helps explain why such 
cases are so difficult.
COnClUsiOn
 The value fulfillment theory says that to live well is to succeed in terms of our 
own values. The best life we can live (in terms of our own well-being) is the one in 
which we get the most value fulfillment overall, and what is good for us to do now 
is whatever contributes to living a life that is closer to this ideal, which will some-
times require changing our values in some way. The value fulfillment theory does 
make well-being an ideal, though the ideal is relative to the evaluative outlook of 
the person. Therefore, well-being is both ideal and psychological. Unlike other theo-
ries that define well-being in terms of our idealized psychological states, VFT does 
not propose particular norms for the improvement of individual psychological states 
such as full information, rationality, or authenticity. rather, it asks that we evaluate 
our current values by comparing them to an ideal of life in which we succeed in terms 
of the standards imposed by what we care about over the long term. since there are 
many paths to an ideal life for a person that change as life goes on, applying this theory 
to real life is a challenging process. a theory of well-being can help us in this process 
by identifying the standards of success that we should employ, and the dangers we 
should aim to avoid, when we are assessing how well people are doing and imagining 
how they might do better.
 it is impossible to provide a complete defense of a theory of well-being in a 
single paper and i have not tried to do that. i hope to have highlighted some of the ad-
vantages of thinking of well-being in terms of values and ideals of value fulfillment, 
10.  i was prompted to think about the difficulties involved in this kind of case by an article in the 
new york Times Magazine entitled “living the good lie” (swartz 2011).
Journal of Practical Ethics
 VALERIE TIBERIUS18
however, and to have addressed one of the main concerns that arise for the applica-
tion of a theory like this.
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